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ENTER THE ORDER, PROTECT THE PRIVILEGE:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR COURTS ENTERING
PROTECTIVE ORDERS UNDER FEDERAL
RULE OF EVIDENCE 502(D)
Edwin M. Buffmire*
INTRODUCTION
The model Rule 502(d)1 order2 resulting from the Symposium on Rule
502 hosted by the Committee on the Rules of Evidence should be
implemented into courts’ standard pretrial case management practice.
Through this Essay, I hope to justify encouragement of its use. But I also
hope to highlight potential points of friction with the attorney-client
privilege that 502(d) orders may tempt. I will first briefly address the
benefits of Rule 502(d). Then I will address some critiques that have been
levied against courts entering 502(d) orders sua sponte, and explain why
those critiques are meritless. Finally, I will walk through examples of
courts that have properly utilized 502(d) orders, as well as some that have
perhaps gone astray.
Courts must be mindful of stretching the enabled benefits of the model
order too far. Certain decisions related to compelled disclosure, costshifting, and scheduling that are ostensibly justified by the protections of
Rule 502(d) can implicate paternalistic concerns. Courts must be mindful
of different concerns than litigants because courts’ discovery rulings, when
they would not otherwise be the same absent a 502(d) order,3 can make de
facto choices that should be left to litigants.

* Law Clerk to the Honorable Richard R. Clifton, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit; Northwestern University School of Law, J.D. 2011; Princeton University, A.B.
2007. I am deeply grateful to Chief Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater and Professor Daniel Capra
for the opportunity to participate in this Symposium. I thank each of the impressive
participants for a memorable and educational experience. All opinions, mistakes, and
misstatements made on the following pages are solely my own and in no way reflect the
opinions of Judge Clifton, to whom I can never extend enough thanks.
1. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
2. Model Draft of a Rule 502(d) Order, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587 (2013).
3. See Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., Nos. 1:10CV00037, 1:10CV00041, 2012 WL 2526982,
at *3–4 (W.D. Va. June 29, 2012) (holding that cost-shifting was not appropriate because the
502(d) order justified a less intensive review); Radian Asset Assurance, Inc. v. Coll. of the
Christian Bros. of N.M., No. CIV 09-0885 JB/DJS, 2010 WL 4928866, at *8–9 (D.N.M.
Oct. 22, 2010) (ordering production of documents without review because the party was
protected by Rule 502(d)).
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A Rule 502(d) order bestows many potential benefits on litigants.4 And
the order, standing alone, poses no risk to parties because, once entered, the
parties are free to tailor the privilege review necessary to protect attorneyclient privilege and work product in a given case.5 Rule 502(d) only
provides protection, from a litigant’s perspective. It provides protection
against the opposing party within the federal proceeding as well as
protection against nonparties beyond the given proceeding.6 Because
502(d) orders confer these protections within the proceeding—internal
protections—as well as beyond the given proceeding in which the order is
entered—external protections—502(d) orders can also reduce the cost and
time necessary to complete discovery by allowing parties to reduce or
forego privilege review without fear of privilege waiver.7 Through the
implementation of 502(d) orders into standard practice, litigants (and
courts) can, by default, benefit from the Rule’s protections and choose how
and whether to take advantage of the efficiencies made possible by Rule
502(d).
But a court, by uncritically utilizing a “more is better” approach, can
implicate justifiable complaints about 502(d) orders that would otherwise
not be present. Courts must be mindful of the parties’ freedom to choose
for themselves the risk they are willing to endure regarding their privileged
information and, consequently, the level of review they conduct.
Otherwise, 502(d) orders could become a mechanism through which courts
erode the attorney-client privilege due to courts’ efforts to increase the
speed and efficiency of modern litigation. In this short Essay, I provide a
framework through which courts can be sure to enable the benefits of the
model order without treading on the attorney-client privilege.
Courts can best take advantage of the benefits bestowed by Rule 502
without eroding a party’s right to keep his adversary from learning
privileged information by remaining cognizant of the distinction between
internal and external benefits. A court should be wary of changing the
status quo between parties on account of the model order’s potential
internal benefits. However, courts should freely embrace the external
benefits conferred by a 502(d) order and reject parties’ attempts to resist
disclosure, delay proceedings, or justify costs based on the perceived risk of
disclosure beyond the opposing party within the given litigation. A 502(d)
order benefits parties far beyond its ability to reduce privilege review, and
privilege review should not be a consideration or justification for a court’s
actions on motions to compel, deadlines, or cost-shifting during the
discovery process.
4. See Edwin M. Buffmire, The (Unappreciated) Multidimensional Benefits of Rule
502(d): Why and How Litigants Should Better Utilize the New Federal Rule of Evidence,
79 TENN. L. REV. 141 (2011).
5. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.
6. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
7. See Radian Asset Assurance, Inc., 2010 WL 4928866, at *8–9 (ordering disclosure
under a Rule 502(d) order so that the party could reduce the cost of production by
conducting a limited privilege review).
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I. BACKGROUND AND BENEFITS
Congress and the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Rules of
Evidence sought to reduce the costs of litigation by reducing the investment
of time and resources required to protect the attorney-client privilege.8
Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 502 to accomplish this goal,9
and section (d) is the most significant tool the Rule provides to courts and
litigants. Section (d) states: “CONTROLLING EFFECT OF A COURT ORDER.—
A federal court may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by
disclosure connected with the litigation before the court—in which event
the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state
proceeding.”10 Rule 502(d) orders eliminate the default provision of
subsection (b), which directs courts to analyze the reasonableness of the
steps taken to protect privilege in order to determine whether the privilege
has been waived.11 By eliminating the reasonableness analysis, 502(d)
eliminates uncertainty.12 This section discusses the different ways in which
Rule 502(d) orders benefit litigants in order to frame how courts should
consider, but not overextend, those benefits.
The Committee and Congress intended for Rule 502(d), in conjunction
with the other provisions, to substantially assist in reducing the costs of
litigation related to privilege review.13 One mechanism by which it
achieves this goal is allowing parties to reduce the actual review undertaken
prior to production.14 Indeed, the advisory committee’s notes specifically
contemplate the idea Judge Scheindlin raised in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC,15 that an order could “allow the parties to forego privilege review
altogether.”16

8. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 109TH CONG., SUMMARY OF THE REPORT
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 22–23
(Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter JUDICIAL SUMMARY], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/

uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf (noting that the discovery of
electronically stored information is “characterized by exponentially greater volume than
hard-copy documents,” and that national rules are required to reduce the debilitating effect of
inconsistency on large organizations and individual litigants alike); see also Anthony Francis
Bruno, Note, Preserving Attorney-Client Privilege in the Age of Electronic Discovery,
54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 541, 543–44 (2009/10).
9. 154 CONG. REC. 18015 (2008).
10. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
11. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
12. Buffmire, supra note 4, at 162.
13. See Memorandum from the Honorable Jerry E. Smith, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Evidence Rules to the Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of
Practice & Procedure 13–14 (May 15, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum from the Advisory
Committee], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Excerpt_
EV_Report_Pub.pdf.
14. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note.
15. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
16. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (citing Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at
290).

1624

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

Party agreement is not required for a court to enter a Rule 502(d) order.17
This feature was necessary because individual plaintiffs, or even a class of
individuals, may not possess large amounts of privileged information or
have to produce documents at all.18 Gaining nothing from its protections,
the parties might have incentive to reject a protective order.19 Courts can
also enter the order sua sponte.20
Prior to enactment of Rule 502, parties often could not justify saving
money by reducing privilege review, because the risk of loss was too
great.21 The risk was magnified because party agreements to not waive
privilege in any given litigation had no effect in later proceedings.22 Now,
Rule 502(d) ensures that the risk associated with the consequences of
inadvertent disclosure is very limited, in part because of the protections in
later or parallel proceedings.23 Because risk is limited by Rule 502(d),
parties can justify cost reductions.
But nothing in either Rule 502(d) or the model order inherently reduces
the level of care taken in reviewing documents. Litigators should still
undertake a thorough privilege review of documents that are likely to
contain substantive communications between an attorney and client that a
client wants to keep confidential. In fact, they are obligated to do so under
state ethical rules.24 Rule 502(d) merely allows a party to customize a
privilege review pursuant to the demands of a particular case.25 If
discoverable documents are unlikely to contain any relevant privileged
communications, then a party can skip review, save a substantial amount of
money, and disclose those documents confident that a privileged email
included therein cannot be the subject of a lengthy inquiry at a later
deposition.26 Rule 502(d) orders allow a party to make an individual costbenefit analysis of privilege review for each document production.27
Because of a Rule 502(d) order, a party can accurately analyze the costs and
17. Id.; Hearing of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 250 (Jan. 29, 2007)
[hereinafter Advisory Comm. Hearing], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/2007-01-29-Evidence-Minutes-Transcript.pdf (testimony of Peter
Sullivan, Attorney, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed LLP).
18. Advisory Comm. Hearing, supra note 17, at 250.
19. Id.
20. 154 CONG. REC. 18,017 (2008).
21. See Advisory Comm. Hearing, supra note 17, at 83 (testimony of Patrick Oot,
Director of Electronic Discovery & Senior Council, Verizon).
22. Id. at 89.
23. Id. at 89–90.
24. See Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need To
Revise Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 196, 241–42 (2010) (discussing
state ethical obligations and proposing revisions to the rules of professional conduct in order
to provide increased guidance to practitioners faced with the possibility of inadvertent
disclosures during discovery); infra Part II.B.
25. See 154 CONG. REC. 18,016–17 (2008).
26. See id. (noting that 502(d) allows “parties to conduct and respond to discovery
expeditiously, without the need for exhaustive pre-production privilege reviews”); Andrew J.
Peck, The Federal Rules Governing Electronic Discovery, AM. BAR ASS’N, 11 (June 4,
2009), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-annualcle/09/materials/data/papers/138.pdf.
27. See 154 CONG. REC. 18,016–17; Peck, supra note 26, at 11.
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benefits internal to the litigation in which the document request is made.
Without a Rule 502(d) order, the risks are difficult to quantify due to the
virtually unknowable risk external to the litigation in which the disclosure is
made.
A Rule 502(d) order also benefits a party by minimizing the damage
when an inadvertent disclosure of privileged information occurs: “It may
be damaging for an opposing party to learn such information, which, absent
the mistaken disclosure, it would not have learned. On the other hand, it
would be more damaging” if that document becomes admissible at trial due
to the imperfect privilege review.28 An opposing party may gain leverage
in settlement negotiations upon learning information through a privileged
document, but that leverage substantially increases if the opposing party
possesses the additional threat of putting the particular document before a
jury or in front of a witness.29 Rule 502(d) eliminates the possibility of this
happening.30
Mistakes are made even when parties believe they are thoroughly
reviewing documents for privilege.31
Rule 502(d) provides added
assurance that the damage from such a mistake is mitigated.32 But it neither
increases nor decreases the likelihood of that mistake. Therefore, it is no
response to the potential benefits of Rule 502(d) that an opposing party
cannot unlearn the information once it is disclosed. There is simply no
relationship between that fear and the rule itself. Moreover, the critique
ignores the benefits for a party from using the rule whether or not such a
disclosure is made.33
For repeat litigants, Rule 502(d) provides additional benefits.34 In
addition to the certainty that an order under Rule 502(d) provides in any
single case by eliminating the reasonableness review of Rule 502(b), the
rule provides that an order will have controlling effect in any other federal
or state litigation as well.35 Multiple ongoing lawsuits may require a large
28. Buffmire, supra note 4, at 185.
29. See Memorandum from the Advisory Committee, supra note 13, at 2–3.
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Datel Holdings, Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C-09-05535 EDL, 2011 WL
866993, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011) (discussing the mistake made in the case before the
court as well as others); Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645, 659 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (noting that
the disclosure of privileged documents was “broad, and the error—regardless of the
[percentage of documents containing privileged information]—not insignificant.”); see
Schaefer, supra note 24, at 199–202 (discussing the exponential growth of clients’
production of discoverable information during the last decade, and the inevitable issues with
inadvertent disclosure resulting from the sheer quantity of privileged information lawyers
must now review).
32. See Memorandum from the Advisory Committee, supra note 13, at 10–11.
33. Compare Buffmire, supra note 4, at 167 (discussing the multiple benefits of Rule
502(d) and the lack of risk), with Jessica Wang, Comment, Nonwaiver Agreements After
Federal Rule of Evidence 502: A Glance at Quick-Peek and Clawback Agreements, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1835, 1846–47 (2009) (arguing that once an adversary sees a privileged
document the damage is already done, thus making the use of protective orders too risky).
34. See Buffmire, supra note 4, at 167.
35. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note.
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entity to conduct extensive privilege review in each case simply because a
disclosure in one proceeding will result in a waiver in another jurisdiction.36
Rule 502(d) cabins the disclosure to the litigation before the court and
ensures that the document will not be admitted in that litigation or any
other.37 Thus, a large entity responding to broad discovery requests can
conduct a privilege review tailored to the needs of a case and the batch of
information requested. If the cost to cull privileged documents from a large
production outweighs the cost of the other party obtaining the information,
then a party may choose to conduct a limited review, or forego privilege
review altogether.38 Rule 502(d) orders enable these choices.
Rule 502(d) benefits courts too. To be sure, courts are beginning to make
use of Rule 502(d) in order to limit the potential discovery disputes during
litigation.39 But parties are not using 502(d) orders,40 despite their benefits.
Entry of 502(d) orders avoids judicial resolution of 502(b) disputes,
provides protections to the parties so that there is less incentive to litigate
discovery disputes, and could potentially reduce the cost of litigation.
Consequently, 502(d) orders reduce consumption of scarce judicial
resources, which is what Congress had in mind when it enacted the Rule.41
The benefit that Rule 502(d) provides to repeat litigants clarifies the
connection between increased certainty and reduced litigation costs—the
increased certainty enables more significant and consistent litigation cost
reduction. This benefit was one of the primary concerns raised in the
hearings leading up to Rule 502’s enactment.42 The discussion of repeat
litigants also highlights how the benefits of Rule 502(d) are felt both within
the litigation in which the order is entered and externally in other
proceedings. Parties benefit internally from the certainty that a disclosure
will not result in waiver. They also benefit in the event of a truly
inadvertent disclosure that the opposing party will be unable to use that
document before the jury. These protections lead to a third benefit internal
to the litigation: a party can choose to reduce or forego privilege review in
order to possibly reduce costs and increase the speed of the litigation.
Those same benefits then apply externally as well.

36. See Hearing of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 27–28 (Jan. 12, 2007)
[hereinafter Phoenix Hearing], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/EV_Hearing_Transcript_011207.pdf
(testimony
of
Michael
O’Connor, Attorney, Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, PLC).
37. See Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in
the Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211,
261 (2006).
38. See Chevron Corp. v. Weinberg Grp., No. 11-mc-409 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2012).
39. See infra Part III.
40. See Panel Discussion, Reinvigorating Rule 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1533, 1535
(2013).
41. Buffmire, supra note 4, at 169.
42. See Phoenix Hearing, supra note 36, at 28.
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II. MANY CRITICISMS OF COURTS IMPOSING 502(D) ORDERS
ARE UNFOUNDED
As courts have increasingly entered 502(d) orders either sua sponte or
absent party agreements,43 attorneys have asserted new arguments in
support of their objections. One argument questions the power of courts to
enter the order sua sponte.44 Another argues that 502(d) orders may
implicate or even conflict with an attorney’s state ethical obligations.45
Neither critique has merit.
A. The Power To Enter a 502(d) Order Sua Sponte.
Courts entering 502 orders sua sponte have recently been the subject of
an interesting critique, namely that the text of the rule itself does not
empower courts to enter the order sua sponte.46 The authors of one
particular critique argue that “[n]othing in the text of Rule 502 gives federal
courts the power to enter a nonwaiver agreement sua sponte.”47 They
contend that until July 2010, nonwaiver orders were only the product of
party agreement.48 This argument is flawed.
Unlike most of the Federal Rules, Congress enacted Rule 502.49 So the
typical arguments in support of textualism may apply more readily to Rule
502 than to other Federal Rules that Congress did not enact.50 As one court
noted regarding Rule 502, albeit a different provision than 502(d), “the

43. See infra Part III.
44. Note that this critique is different than the challenge to courts’ power to enter a Rule
502(d) order that binds state courts, which I have addressed elsewhere. See Buffmire, supra
note 4, at 178 (discussing, among other commentaries); Henry S. Noyes, Federal Rule of
Evidence 502: Stirring the State Law of Privilege and Professional Responsibility with a
Federal Stick, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 673, 678 (2009) (arguing that Rule 502 exceeds
Congress’s Commerce Clause power, violates the Due Process Clause in certain situations,
and raises serious questions about a federal court’s power to enter orders binding in state
courts).
45. See infra Part II.B.
46. H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Broad Federal Court Powers Under
Evidence Rule 502(d), N.Y. L.J., Apr. 5, 2011, at 5.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Act to Address the Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work
Product Doctrine, Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537 (2008) [hereinafter Act to Address
Privilege Waiver] (enacting Rule 502 into law on September 19, 2008).
50. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 600–01 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“This
Court has repeatedly stated that when statutory language is plain, it must be enforced
according to its terms. . . . [T]here is no factual basis for the assumption . . . that every
policy seemingly consistent with federal statutory text has been authorized by Congress.”);
City of Joliet v. New West, L.P., 562 F.3d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 2009) (“When courts rely on
purpose clauses, rather than the concrete rules that the political branches have selected to
achieve the stated ends, judges become effective lawmakers, bypassing the give-and-take of
the legislative process.”). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure
in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994).
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Advisory Committee Note is not the law, the rule is.”51 But here, Rule
502(d) expressly provides that “[a] federal court may order that the
privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the
litigation pending before the court—in which event the disclosure is also
not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.”52 There is no
inherent requirement that the order can only be entered “upon motion.” So
a strictly textualist argument would not read such a requirement into the
rule.53 The argument raises an interesting point—one not often discussed in
the context of a Federal Rule of Evidence—but it should not dissuade
courts from entering 502(d) orders sua sponte.
Aside from the text that imposes no limitation on a court’s ability to enter
the 502(d) order sua sponte, a court’s inherent power to act sua sponte
under a federal rule, even when not expressly provided by the rule in
question, is nothing new. The Supreme Court held in Link v. Wabash
Railroad,54 that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permitted sua sponte
orders of dismissal, though the rule only explicitly mentioned dismissals
effected by a party.55 Federal Rule of Evidence 105 similarly does not
mention courts’ power to give limiting instructions sua sponte.56 Yet,
courts must nonetheless give such instructions sua sponte if the evidence
has the potential to prejudice a defendant substantially.57 So courts should
not be hesitant to adopt the model order as part of their standard case
management or discovery orders.
This critique’s main concern, though, is not simply that courts are
without power to enter the order sua sponte, but that parties would be
ordered to produce documents without review.58 As I will discuss below,
courts should avoid that result.59 However, it is unrelated to the court’s
power under Rule 502(d).
B. Attorneys’ Ethical Obligations
Some have questioned whether Rule 502(d) implicates ethical concerns
for attorneys.60 This fear is also unfounded. Indeed, ethical obligations
51. Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Cent. City Brewing Co., 275 F.R.D. 43, 48 (D. Mass.
2011) (quoting United States v. Carey, 120 F.3d 509, 512 (4th Cir. 1997)) (discussing FED.
R. EVID. 502(a)).
52. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
53. Rule 502(e), however, could lend support for this the criticism of sua sponte orders,
but any argument similarly fails. Rule 502(e) relates to party agreements. It states that party
agreements will only be binding on those parties, unless it is incorporated into a court order.
FED. R. EVID. 502(e). But we already know that party agreements are not the only
circumstance in which a 502(d) order can be entered. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
54. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
55. Id. at 630–32.
56. FED. R. EVID. 105.
57. United States v. Brawner, 32 F.3d 602, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
58. Boehning & Toal, supra note 46.
59. See discussion infra at Part III.B.
60. See Ann M. Murphy, Federal Rule of Evidence 502: The “Get Out of Jail Free”
Provision—or Is It?, 41 U.N.M. L. REV. 193, 234 (2011) (“All of these opinions require that

2013]

ENTER THE ORDER, PROTECT THE PRIVILEGE

1629

arguably weigh in favor of entry of a Rule 502(d) order rather than against
it.
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) provides that “[a] lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless
the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by
paragraph (b).”61 Ethical opinions interpreting the rule require attorneys to
take reasonable care to keep privileged information confidential when
producing client documents.62
But these are not reasons to decline to enter a 502(d) order. Paragraph
(b) of Rule 1.6 provides that “a lawyer may reveal information relating to
the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary: . . . (6) to comply with other law or a court order.”63 Further,
Rule 1.6 permits disclosure with informed consent.64 So attorneys should
counsel clients about the benefits of Rule 502(d), not unilaterally decide to
disclose privileged information.65 Regardless of their decision on the
privilege review procedures, attorneys should explain to clients the added
protections of Rule 502(d). An attorney will not run afoul of ethical
obligations by entry of a 502(d) order.66 First, the order does not require
disclosure absent review, and a client can consent to that protocol. Second,
disclosure pursuant to a court order does not violate Rule 1.6.
In fact, Rule 502(d) affords additional protection to a client’s information
at no cost. Because Rule 502(d)’s protections effectively preclude the
possibility of waiver as a consequence of inadvertent disclosure of
the attorney take ‘reasonable steps’ ‘reasonable precautions’ or ‘reasonable care’ in
transmitting a client’s documents and information. . . . [T]his creates a problem for an
attorney’s use of FRE 502(d) and (e).”); Schaefer, supra note 24, at 241–42.
61. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).
62. Murphy, supra note 60, at 234 (citing Ala. State Bar Office of the Gen. Counsel,
Formal Op. 2007-02 (2007); State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Counsel, Formal Op. 07-03 (2007);
Ethics Comm. of the Colo. State Bar Ass’n Formal Op. 119 (2008); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics
Comm., Op. 341 (2007); Fla. Bar Ethics Dep’t, Op. 06-2 (2006); Ky. Bar Ass’n, Office of
Bar Counsel, Op. KBA E-374 (1995); Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 196 (2008); Minn.
Lawyer’s Prof’l Responsibility Board, Op. No. 22 (2010); N.H. Bar Ass’n., Ethics Comm.,
Op. 2008-2009/4 (2008-2009), N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 701 (2006); N.Y.
State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 749 (2001); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782 (2004); Vt. Bar Ass’n, Op. 2009-1 (2009); W. Va. Bar Ass’n, Lawyer
Disciplinary Board, Formal Op. L.E.O. 2009-1 (2009)); see also Louise L. Hill, Emerging
Technology and Client Confidentiality: How Changing Technology Brings Ethical
Dilemmas, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 27–45 (2010) (summarizing some of the ethical
opinions).
63. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2012).
64. Id. R. 1.6(b).
65. See Buffmire, supra note 4, at 184; Schaefer, supra note 24, at 247–48 (proposing
additional comments to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 in order to provide
guidance to attorneys in discussing the potential risk of inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information inherent in protective orders, such as those under Rule 502(d)).
66. See, e.g., Belcher v. United States, No. 3:12-cv-04717, 2012 WL 5386564, at *2–3
(S.D. W. Va. Nov. 1, 2012) (rejecting an attorney’s attempt to rely on Rule 1.6 to avoid
being compelled to disclose communications with a client).
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privileged information, it is difficult to argue that an attorney took
reasonable steps to protect the communications whenever a court holds that
privilege was waived by a disclosure.
III. COURTS BENEFIT FROM 502(D) ORDERS, ESPECIALLY WHEN ENTERED
AT THE OUTSET OF LITIGATION
Several recent district court decisions have included 502(d) orders.67 But
the decisions have arisen from discovery disputes. For example, courts are
beginning to invoke Rule 502(d) in conjunction with orders on motions to
compel. While this development is an improvement, many times the
dispute could have been resolved, or prevented, if the order had been
entered at the outset of the case.
A. The Good: Courts Using 502(d) Orders To Facilitate Just, Speedy,
and (Comparatively) Inexpensive Litigation
A Texas district court used a Rule 502(d) order to protect a party against
privilege waiver in separate litigation.68 In Whitaker, Chalk, Swindle &
Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp.,69 a law firm filed suit against a
former client for unpaid legal fees.70 The claim arose out of the law firm’s
representation and billing in litigation that remained ongoing in a Texas
state court.71 The client sought to stay the federal proceedings and to be
relieved of Rule 26(a) disclosure obligations because it feared that
disclosures in the fee dispute litigation would waive privilege for those
documents in the state court litigation.72 In response to plaintiff’s argument
that Rule 502(d) would address the former client’s concerns, the former
client argued that Rule 502(d) “is limited to inadvertent disclosures.”73 The
court correctly held that it was within the court’s authority under Rule
502(d) to order that any disclosure of privileged information would not
result in waiver in the state proceeding.74
Courts have also used Rule 502(d) to facilitate discovery when attorneyclient privilege or work-product protection was not central to the dispute.
In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, Inc.,75 a discovery dispute
arose over production of trade secrets, and the parties could not agree on an

67. Baez-Eliza v. Instituto Psicoterapeutico de P.R., 275 F.R.D. 65, 67–68 (D.P.R.
2011); Radian Asset Assurance, Inc. v. Coll. of the Christian Bros. of N.M., No. 09-0885,
2010 WL 4928866 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010).
68. Whitaker, Chalk, Swindle & Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp., No. 4:08-CV684-Y, 2009 WL 464989, at *2, *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009).
69. Id. at *1.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *2.
73. Id. at *4.
74. Id. (noting its authority under Rule 502(d)).
75. N. Natural Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., No. 08-1400-WEB-DWB, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8810 (D. Kan. Feb. 1, 2010).
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appropriate protective order.76 In resolving the dispute, the court fashioned
a protective order to govern the discovery process.77 The court included a
provision in the order that stated, “Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
502(d), any privilege or protection shall not be waived by inadvertent
disclosure connected with this Litigation.”78 There was no reason that this
provision could not have been included in a default protective order, but it
is nonetheless a good example of a court implementing Rule 502(d).
Rule 502(d) also reduces the consumption of judicial resources otherwise
required to resolve privilege disputes.79 For example, a party may be more
willing to disclose certain documents it would otherwise claim on a
privilege log if the disclosing party could be assured that the disclosure will
not result in waiver in the present litigation or any other litigation in the
future.80 This will reduce the need for a court to adjudicate disputes over
whether documents may be properly withheld on grounds of privilege.
Courts should enter 502(d) orders in cases that have already begun, in order
to narrow the field of potential dispute. Courts may also couple a
nonwaiver ruling under Rule 502(b) with an order under Rule 502(d). This
mechanism has important implications for subsequent litigation. Though a
court does not find waiver, a court examining that disclosure in a separate
proceeding may view the reasonableness analysis differently.81 As a New
Jersey district court judge ruled in Peterson v. Bernardi,82 a court may
include language along with its Rule 502(b) holding that “pursuant to FRE
502(d) any privilege or discovery protection attached to [the relevant
documents] is not waived by the inadvertent disclosure in this court.”83
In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability
Litigation84 illustrates how the use of Rule 502(d) can avoid unnecessary
disputes.85 A special master was appointed to resolve a year-long discovery
dispute over defendant’s assertion of privilege on tens of thousands of
documents.86 After the special master reviewed in camera a sample of 120
documents claimed on the defendant’s privilege log, the defendant agreed
to produce fifty-six of the documents without further litigation of the
76. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motions for Protective Orders and Entry
of Protective Order, N. Natural Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., No. 08-1400-WEB-DWB,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8810, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 1, 2010).
77. Id. at *8–21.
78. Id. at *16 (emphasis in original).
79. Buffmire, supra note 4, at 169.
80. See Eighth Report and Recommendation of the Special Master As to Documents
Withheld Pursuant to the Attorney-Client Privilege and/or the Work-Product Doctrine, In re
Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1871 07-md-01871-CMR (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 2, 2009), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122246 (producing party agreed to produce certain
documents coupled with entry of 502(d) order).
81. Buffmire, supra note 4, at 163−65.
82. 262 F.R.D. 424 (D.N.J. 2009).
83. Id. at 431.
84. No. 1871 07-md-01871-CMR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122246 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2,
2009).
85. Eighth Report and Recommendation, supra note 80.
86. Id. at *1.
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matter, provided that the court entered a nonwaiver order.87 The 502(d)
order used clear language.88 Because Rule 502(d) protects the documents
from waiver—provided they are in fact privileged—the disclosing party can
afford to be less conservative in protecting a document’s secrecy since it
has less to lose from disclosure.
Magistrate Judge Facciola, a leading authority on discovery issues,
recently entered a 502(d) order that implicates the numerous benefits
afforded by 502(d) orders as well as the related discovery decisions.89 The
order reflects the proper analysis and considerations that courts should use
when they choose to enter 502(d) orders absent party agreement.
Judge Facciola entered the order after extensive litigation related to the
Weinberg Group’s claims of privilege.90 Judge Facciola had previously
ordered the Weinberg Group to produce certain documents previously
withheld under a claim of work-product privilege, subject to redactions of
any “true opinion work product.”91 Therein he stated that he would “grant
an order pursuant to Rule 502(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence that
would alleviate any concern [the Weinberg Group] has about [disclosure of
documents containing work product] constituting a waiver in any other state
or federal proceedings.”92 When the Weinberg Group moved for entry of
the 502(d) order, it stated that it was willing to produce all documents
requested by Chevron without redacting opinion work product, provided
that it would not amount to a waiver of the right to assert a privilege when
Chevron attempted to use those documents.93 Judge Facciola rejected a
procedure relating to Weinberg Group’s assertion of protection, but
ultimately entered the order so that the parties could exchange information,

87. Id. at *2, 34–35.
88. Id. at *34–35 (“GSK’s production of the approximately 56 documents, which it
agreed to produce in a September 15, 2009 meeting with the Special Discovery Master, shall
not constitute a waiver of any privilege or protection with respect to: (a) those documents;
(b) any other communications or documents relating to the subject matter of those
documents; or (c) any other communications or documents relating to the parties who sent or
received or are named in those documents. This Order is, and shall be construed as, an
Order under Rule 502(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence ordering that privilege or
protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before this
Court. Accordingly, as is explicitly set forth in Rule 502(d), the production of these
documents is not a waiver of any privilege or protection in any other federal or state
proceeding. Without limiting the foregoing, the existence of this Order shall not in any way
impair or affect GSK’s legal right to assert privilege claims for the documents produced in
any other actions, shall not effect a waiver, and shall not be used to argue that any waiver of
privilege or protection has occurred by virtue of any production of these documents in this
case before this Court or any other Court or in any other litigation or proceeding.” (emphasis
added)).
89. Chevron Corp. v. Weinberg Grp., No. 11-mc-409 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2012).
90. Id. at 2.
91. Id.
92. Id.(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Chevron Corp.
v. Weinberg Grp., 286 F.R.D. 95 (D.D.C. 2012)).
93. Id.
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and Weinberg Group could later seek protection without waiving workproduct protection.94
Judge Facciola’s order is an exemplar of what a court should consider
when entering a 502(d) order, both for what it contemplated and what it did
not. First, Judge Facciola told the parties that he would grant a 502(d) order
to alleviate the producing party’s concern related to waiver in other state or
federal proceedings.95 So the 502(d) order was a tool to reduce the risk of
information being disclosed to parties external to the litigation. Second,
Judge Facciola did not compel production of documents, or information
contained therein, that would otherwise be subject to opinion work-product.
He instead ordered Weinberg Group to produce documents with the
protected information redacted.96 In doing so, he allowed Weinberg Group
to determine the protected information it would withhold in the case before
him (provided, of course, it was protectable). Weinberg Group decided that
it could disclose potentially protected information in this case if the
protection was not waived, particularly in other proceedings.97 But
Weinberg Group made that decision, not the court.
B. The Bad: Potentially Problematic Orders
Courts should routinely enter 502(d) orders, but the order’s protections
seem to tempt certain pathologies that courts should resist. The reduced
privilege review made possible through 502(d) orders should not influence
cost-shifting determinations related to the production of electronically
stored information (ESI). Rule 502(d) does not mandate a reduced
privilege review and the consequent cost-savings, and that choice should be
solely that of the party conducting the review. When courts assume the
possibility of a reduced privilege review and base their cost-shifting ruling
on a reduced review, they incrementally take that choice away from parties.
Courts also should not justify an order of production without review by
citing to the presence of a 502(d) order preventing waiver of any privileged
information. Doing so effectively requires a party to forego privilege
review that would otherwise be proper absent the protective order. A court
can also overextend the benefits of 502(d) by expediting the discovery
schedule to the point that no review is feasible. Courts should be aware of
these potential pitfalls, usually made with the best intentions of reducing
cost and increasing efficiency, because they can erode the protections of the
attorney-client privilege.
In Adair v. EQT Production Co.,98 the court ordered production of ESI in
part because the 502(d) order justified a less cost-intensive privilege

94. Id. at 3.
95. Chevron Corp. v. Weinberg Grp., 286 F.R.D. 95, 101 (2012).
96. Id. at 100 (ordering that Weinberg only redact information that would disclose
opinion work product).
97. Chevron, No. 11-mc-409, slip op. at 2.
98. Nos. 1:10CV00037, 1:10CV00041, 2012 WL 2526982 (W.D. Va. June 29, 2012).
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review.99 The district court issued its order following the parties’
objections to the magistrate judge’s order holding the same.100 The parties’
protective order provided that a producing party was “specifically
authorized to produce Protected Documents without a prior privilege
review, and the producing party shall not be deemed to have waived any
privilege or production in not undertaking such a review.”101 Assuming
that this language justified protection under Rule 502(d) without
specifically invoking the Rule,102 disclosure of privileged information
during discovery would not waive privilege in the Adair proceeding or any
other state or federal litigation.103
The Adair court’s analysis of the cost shifting issue provides a useful
example of the potential erosion of the attorney-client privilege as a result
of overextending the benefits of a 502(d) order. The cost-shifting issue
arose from a discovery dispute in which the plaintiff requested emails and
other ESI that the defendant argued it should not be required to produce
without the plaintiff bearing the cost of the production.104
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) protects a party from being
required to produce ESI that is not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost.105 As an initial matter, it is not well settled whether the cost
of privilege review is properly considered when a court reviews a discovery
request for undue burden and cost under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(2)(B).106 But that is a different question. If a given discovery request
calls for ESI that is unduly burdensome absent a 502(d) order (regardless of
whether cost of privilege review is a factor) then it should remain unduly
burdensome when a 502(d) order is in place. A court erodes the delicate
balance struck by the discovery rules and attorney-client privilege when it
either orders production of the ESI without review or denies a request to
shift the cost of the production because of a 502(d) order where costshifting or privilege protection is otherwise appropriate.
In Adair, the court did just that. It held that cost-shifting was not
necessary because the production could proceed using only electronic
searches for responsiveness and privilege “without further individual
review.”107 It noted further that “this approach would not be appropriate

99. Id. at *4.
100. Id. at *1 (referencing Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:10cv00037, 2012 WL 1965880
(W.D. Va. May 31, 2012)).
101. Id. (quoting the protective order).
102. Buffmire, supra note 4, at 172–74.
103. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
104. Adair, 2012 WL 2526982, at *1 (quoting the protective order).
105. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
106. Compare Universal Del., Inc., v. Comdata Corp., No. 07-1078, 2010 WL 1381225
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010) (ordering cost shifting for the cost of production, not including the
cost of privilege review), with Rodriguez-Torres v. Gov’t Dev. Bank of P.R., 265 F.R.D. 40,
44 (D.P.R. 2010) (holding that requested ESI was not reasonably accessible because of
undue burden and cost, including the cost of privilege and confidentiality review).
107. Adair, 2012 WL 2526982, at *3.

2013]

ENTER THE ORDER, PROTECT THE PRIVILEGE

1635

without the existence of the Protective Order and Clawback Order.”108 The
court reasoned that the order to produce documents in this manner was
distinct from an order to produce privileged or nonrelevant information.109
There is a problem when a court steps in and, through the mechanism of
cost-shifting or privilege protection, orders a party to conduct their privilege
review in a certain way. A party and counsel are best positioned to
determine the necessary steps to protect the attorney-client privilege in a
given matter. Courts should not intrude on this province unless the parties
would be required to produce that information to each other regardless of
the protective order in place—as in Whitaker, where the information was
not privileged between the parties.110
This is not to say that a court should never order discovery and point out
that less expensive, often equally thorough, electronic searches are
available. Rather, a court should not bypass Rule 26(b)(5)(B) due to the
presence of the 502(d) order and fail to analyze the burden and expense of
producing information.111 And that analysis should not change when a
502(d) order has been entered because allowing 502(d)’s protections to
infiltrate the default cost-shifting calculus necessarily assumes a party’s
reduction or elimination of privilege review.
One might argue that such an approach incentivizes a party to
overrepresent the burden and necessity of a document-by-document
privilege review in every case. Maybe. But even then, a party can either
choose whether to conduct that review or not. Rule 502 affords the party
the discretion to tailor the privilege review depending on what that
particular case requires. The party then carries the burden of that cost
should it choose to impose the price on itself. The contrary result
effectively discourages, or even precludes, a party from being able to
conduct that review by eliminating cost shifting to which it would otherwise
be entitled or forcing a disclosure without review.
Indeed, a party’s own evaluation of the benefit associated with the cost of
review was likely a relevant issue in Adair.112 The court explicitly pointed
out that, although the responding party was quoting costs of individual
review in support of its overly burdensome argument, “[it] never indicated
that it would rather assume the costs of individualized human review . . .
and would prefer to rely on the [electronic] production process outlined by
the magistrate judge.”113 This realization by both the court and the party
reveals a newly emerging reality—parties should be as comfortable with
electronic review as they typically have been with human review.114 As
108. Id. at *4.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Whitaker, Chalk, Swindle & Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp., No.
4:08-CV-684-Y, 2009 WL 464989, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009).
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
112. Adair, 2012 WL 2526982, at *5.
113. Id.
114. John B. v. Goetz, No. 3:98-0168, 2010 WL 8754110, at *79 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 28,
2010) (noting that courts have recognized that computer searches are a viable means of
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Adair noted, “the risk of inadvertent disclosure is present in every case, and
particularly present in those cases in which the document production is of
significant size. Such inadvertent production can occur and does occur
whether the documents are searched and reviewed electronically or by
human eyes.”115
In Radian Asset Assurance, Inc. v. College of the Christian Brothers of
New Mexico,116 the court explicitly acknowledged that it was ordering the
producing party to disclose information unreviewed.117 The court agreed
that the material requested from backup tapes was not reasonably accessible
and “searching [it] would create an undue burden.”118 But it also held that
“rule 502 is not a cost-shifting tool.”119 And it was not “rely[ing] on rule
502 for its authority to order [the producing party] to produce the [ESI].”120
The court nonetheless ordered the production without review.121 The
court’s reasoning reveals a dangerous fiction.
When a court orders production without review, it effectively orders that
a party does not have attorney-client privilege over those documents. A
party has a right to keep confidential information covered by the attorneyclient privilege.122 When a court orders the disclosure of information
without review, it effects a substantive change in privilege law because the
party no longer has that right to confidentiality over those documents. This
is not to say that the law precludes an order for the disclosure of privileged
information in all circumstances.123 But a 502(d) order should not factor
into that decision. A 502(d) order, by default, protects privilege against
parties external to the litigation through its extension to any other state or
federal proceeding.124 As such, courts ruling on discovery issues should
only consider the 502(d) order for its effects external to the litigation, not
for its protection between parties within the litigation. The internal
protections benefit courts by potentially limiting the range of discovery
reducing privilege review costs); MSF Holding, Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int’l, No. 03 Civ.
1818 PKLJCF, 2005 WL 3338510 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) (noting that some degree of
human error is almost inevitable with a large document production).
115. Adair, 2012 WL 2526982, at *4 (citing FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit
Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 479–80 (E.D. Va. 1991)).
116. No. 09-0885, 2010 WL 4928866 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2010).
117. Id. at *5.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *8.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *9.
122. See Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 482 F.3d 225, 230–31 (3d Cir. 2007) (federal courts
must only apply the privilege where necessary to achieve its purpose); In re Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 303 (6th Cir. 2002). See generally
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (discussing the balance between the search for truth
through discoverable evidence and the need to protect attorney work product and privileged
communications).
123. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568 (1989) (discussing the crime-fraud
exception to privilege and the potential for ordering production of privileged information, if
only to the court, for in camera review to determine whether privilege applies).
124. FED. R. EVID. 502(d).
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disputes, but any benefit beyond that should be the producing party’s choice
because it implicates their right to keep confidential the privileged
information. The contours of a party’s right to keep from his adversary
confidential documents should not change simply because that information
will not be admitted into evidence. Some other justification is needed.
A court’s imposition of discovery deadlines that effectively require a
party to reduce or forego privilege review when it would not otherwise do
so similarly affects the privilege. Courts may be tempted to seek additional
efficiency in the discovery process by ordering shorter deadlines, justified
by the protections afforded through the Rule 502(d) order. And Rule
502(d) may afford a court that ability more readily. But that temptation
should be resisted to the extent that a party desires to keep privileged
information from his adversary within the proceeding, as opposed to a
desire to keep information from actors external to the proceeding. The
Whitaker case is a good example of these considerations.125 The court
ordered the discovery over the objection of the producing party because the
party’s only legitimate objection was that it feared that the discovery would
waive privilege in separate litigation.126 The producing party preferred to
simply stay the discovery.127 Critically, though, Whitaker was a fee-dispute
case between a law firm and a former client.128 Thus, the information that
was privileged as to the separate litigation was not privileged between the
parties within the proceeding in which Judge Means ordered the
discovery.129
CONCLUSION
The model order implicates none of these concerns by its terms. And the
benefits far outweigh the potential missteps. But in order to prevent any
(even slight) erosion of a party’s power to protect its attorney-client
privilege, courts should be aware that their decisions, made to further the
benefits of Rule 502(d), may be subject to paternalistic concerns. Parties
should remain free to tailor privilege review according to their own needs in
a given case. After all, one benefit of 502(d) orders is that they allow a
party to do so. And parties should not lose the benefit of cost-shifting
simply because they have invoked the protections of 502(d). Doing so
effectively requires them to reduce privilege review, thereby undermining
their rights to protection, if only slightly. There is no inherent need for
502(d) orders to be subject to these pathologies, and courts can easily avoid
them if they are aware they exist.
125. Whitaker, Chalk, Swindle & Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp., No. 4:08-CV684-Y, 2009 WL 464989, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009).
126. Id. at *3.
127. Id. at *4.
128. Id. at *1.
129. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 1997)
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 133 (2000)) (discussing
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege).

